Indiana Law Journal
Volume 70

Issue 4

Article 11

Fall 1995

The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights
Robert A. Dubault
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dubault, Robert A. (1995) "The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 70 : Iss. 4 , Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol70/iss4/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The ADA and the NLRA:
Balancing Individual and Collective Rights
ROBERT

A.

DUBAULT*

INTRODUCTION

On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "the Act")' into law Intended to "provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, 2 the ADA creates significant new rights
for the disabled in the areas of employment,3 public services,4 public
transportation, and public accommodation. 6
Hailed as "the most significant civil rights legislation in more than 25
years," 7 the ADA undoubtedly will expand employment opportunities for
many of America's forty-three million disabled persons! In addition to
generally increasing the responsibilities of employers and labor organizations,
the Act also creates the potential for additional conflicts between unions and
employers, given their responsibilities under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 9
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the potential areas of conflict
between the ADA and the NLRA and to propose a method for resolving them.
Part I will discuss briefly the obligations imposed by the ADA and the NLRA
upon employers and labor unions. Part II will identify the areas of potential
conflict between the two statutes, utilizing a memorandum issued by the
former general counsel for the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") as
a model. The purpose of Part III is to demonstrate that under the ADA,
Congress has provided stronger protection for the rights of disabled individuals than under prior civil rights statutes. This will be accomplished by first

* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.B.A., 1990, Western
Michigan University; B.S.B.A., 1985, Central Michigan University. I would like to thank Professor
Terry Bethel, Professor Mark Adams, and Steven Palazzolo for their constructive comments on earlier
drafts of this Note. Also, special thanks to my mother and father for their constant support and
encouragement.
1.42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). For a review of the events leading up to the passage
of the ADA, see Arlene Mayerson, The Amrencans with DisabilitiesAct-An Historic Overview, 7 LAB.
LAW. 1 (1991).
Although the ADA was signed into law in 1990, many of the Act's provisions did not immediately
become effective. For a discussion of whom the ADA covers and the implementation schedule for the
employment provisions of the Act, see infra note 11 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b); see also S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989); H.R. REP. No.
485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
4. Id. §§ 12131-12134.
5. Id. §§ 12141-12165.
6. Id. §§ 12181-12189. The ADA also imposes barrer-free requirements for new construction
projects. Id. § 12201.
7. Julia Lawlor, DisabilitiesNo Longer a Job Bamer, USA TODAY, July 22, 1992, at IA.
8.See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
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reviewing the judicial treatment of discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Second, the legislative history and regulations of the ADA
will be analyzed. Finally, specific provisions of other civil rights statutes will
be discussed and compared to the ADA. Part IV will draw upon Parts I
through III to set forth a balancing framework that employers, unions,
administrative agencies, and the courts can use to resolve ADA/NLRA
conflicts.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADA AND THE NLRA
This Part will lay out, in some detail, the various obligations that the ADA
and the NLRA impose on employers and unions. This review lays the foundation for the discussion in Part II of the areas of conflict between the two
statutes. Part L.A discusses the various rights and obligations created by Title
I of the ADA-the section governing discrimination in employment. Part I.B
examines the obligations imposed on both unions and employers by the
NLRA.
A. Title I of the ADA
Title I of the ADA governs discrimination in employment. The coverage of
the Act is essentially the same as that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII").' The ADA defines a "covered entity" as (1) employers
and their agents engaged in an industry affecting commerce which employ
fifteen or more persons; (2) employment agencies; (3) labor organizations; and
(4) joint labor-management committees." In general, the ADA prohibits
disability-based discrimination against a "qualified individual with a
disability" in the areas of job application procedures, hiring, advancement,
discharge, compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment. 12 Covered entities are also prohibited from
entering into contractual arrangements (including contracts with labor
unions), 13 and from utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration
which have the effect of discriminating against disabled individuals. 4 Unlike

10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1i. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5)(A). Specifically excluded from the ADA's employment provisions
are the United States Government, wholly-owned corporations of the United States, Indian Tribes, and
bona fide private membership clubs (other than labor organizations) which are tax exempt under § 501
of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. § 12111(5)(B).
The employment provisions of the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992, for employers of 25 or
more employees. Id. § 12111(5)(A). The Act's coverage was expanded to cover employers of 15 or
more employees on July 26, 1994. Id., see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
13. Id. § 12112(b)(2). Unlike other civil rights statutes, the ADA contains no exception for bona
fide seniority systems which have the effect of discnminating against covered individuals. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988); see also infra part llI.D.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3). The Act and the final regulations do allow the use of such standards
or criteria if they are job related and consistent with business necessity. Id. § 12112(b)(6); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.7 (1994).
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other civil rights statutes which seek to prohibit employers from engaging in
discriminatory actions, the ADA imposes upon covered entities an affirmative
duty to make "reasonable accommodations" for the known physical or mental
limitations of otherwise qualified individuals, unless it can be shown that a
proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the entity
making it.' 5 Absent a showing of undue hardship, an employer's failure to
make reasonable accommodation will constitute illegal discrimination under
the Act.
Employers are not required to reasonably accommodate all disabled
individuals, however. Only "qualified individuals with disabilities" are entitled
to reasonable accommodation. A qualified individual with a disability is one
who, with or without "reasonable accommodation," can perform the "essential
functions" of the job held or desired. 6 In general, a reasonable accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way a job is typically
performed which will enable the individual to enjoy equal employment
opportunities. 7 Both the statute and the regulations provide examples of
potential accommodations, including (1) making existing facilities accessible
and usable by disabled individuals; (2) job restructuring; (3) instituting parttime or modified work schedules; (4) reassignment to a vacant position; (5)
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; (6) supplying qualified
readers or interpreters; and (7) "other similar accommodations."'" The
regulations accompanying the ADA also provide that in determining the
appropriate reasonable accommodation, "it may be necessary for the covered
entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual
with a disability "1
An employer may restructure a job by reallocating or redistributing
nonessential job functions or by changing when or how the essential job
functions are performed. 20 An employer need not reallocate essential job
functions since those functions are, by definition, the duties that an employee
must be able to perform (with or without reasonable accommodation) in order
to qualify for the position.2' For example, if a security guard develops a

15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
16.Id. § 12111(8). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations outline
a two-step process for determining whether an individual is a "qualified individual with a disability"
(1)whether the person satisfies the requisite skills, experience, education, and other job-related
requirements of the position in question; and (2) whether the person can perform the essential functions
of the position held or desired with or without accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1994).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1994).
18.42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (1994).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1994); see also EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILrrIEs ACT § 3.8(3) (1992) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL] (stating

that the employer should, in consultation with the individual, identify potential accommodations and
assess the effectiveness of each).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app. at 401 (1994).
21. Id. The regulations define essential functions as the "fundamental job duties" of the position.
Id. § 1630.2(n)(1). Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a given function is
"essential" are (1) whether the position exists to perform that function; (2) whether there are a limited
number of employees available among whom the job function can be distributed; and/or (3) whether the
function is highly specialized. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2).
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visual disorder and can no longer perform the required task of inspecting
employee identification badges, the employer would not be required to
reassign this task or hire an assistant to perform the task, since doing so
would require another person to actually perform the job rather than merely
to assist the disabled individual in performing the job.
An employer can assert "undue hardship" as a defense to the duty to
accommodate a disabled employee or applicant. The statute defines undue
hardship as "an action requring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of [certain] factors. 22 These factors include the nature
and cost of the accommodation, the overall financial resources of either the
facility involved or of the covered entity, and the type of operation of the
covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the work
force.23 According to the Interpretive Appendix to the regulations, the
concept of undue hardship is not limited to financial considerations alone.
Undue hardship also refers to any accommodation that would be "unduly
costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive,
or that would fundamentally alter
24
the nature or operation of the business.1
Finally, the ADA includes medical examinations and inquiries within its
general prohibition against discrimination. 25 Nevertheless, pre-employment
medical examinations are allowed-provided that the examination is
performed after the employee has been offered the job26 and it is relevant to
the applicant's ability to perform job-related functions." Voluntary medical
examinations and health histories are also allowed. 28 The Act requires that
all information obtained during medical examinations be maintained in
separate, confidential files and limits disclosure of the information to
supervisors and managers, safety personnel, and government officials. 9
B. Applicable Provisions of the NLRA
The NLRA is the primary body of federal law controlling labor-management
relations in the private sector.3 0 The statute is only one of three separate

Evidence of the essential nature of a job function may include the employer's judgment, written job
descriptions, the amount of time spent performing the task, the consequences of not requiring the
employee to perform the task, work experiences of past incumbents in theJob, current work experiences
of incumbents in similar jobs, and the terms of a collective bargainingagreement. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3).
The importance of considering the terms of the collective bargaining agreement will be discussed infra
at Part IV
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
23. Id. § 1211 (10)(B)(i), (ii), (iv); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (1994).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) app. at 402 (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1).
26. Id. § 12112(d)(3).
27. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
28. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
29. Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
30. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
BARGAINING 1 (1976).

COLLECTIVE
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legislative acts3 which represent Congress' efforts to promote industrial

peace by removing obstacles to, and encouraging the formation of, labor
unions-the primary voice for the individual employee.

2

Section 7 of the

NLRA gives employees several rights, including (1) the right to form labor
organizations; (2) the right to deal collectively with their employer through
those organizations; and (3) the right to engage in concerted activities in
furtherance of those rights.33 The NLRA also imposes several obligations on

employers and labor organizations-jointly as well as in their individual
capacities. For example, § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides that "[ilt shall be an

unfair labor practice for an employer

.to refuse to bargain collectively

with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section

[9(a)] of this title. 34 Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA imposes an identical
obligation upon the employee representative.35 Section 9(a) further states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representativesof all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment
36

These provisions reflect a central principle of American labor law- that the
right of exclusive representation belongs to the majority union. 37 Through
these provisions, the NLRA creates both an "affirmative and negative

mandate" requiring the employer to bargain affirmatively with the labor union
selected by the majority of its employees and, simultaneously, to refrain from
bargaining with anyone other than the employees' representative on matters
covered by the NLRA. 3' The union is responsible for harmonizing the
conflicting interests of its constituents no matter how diverse their skills, age,
or race. By seeking to establish working conditions with individuals or
31. The NLRA is the more commonly used name for the Wagner Act of 1935, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169. The other two statutes are the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144,
171-197 (1988), and the Landrum-Griffen Act of 1959, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
32. GORMAN, supra note 30, at 1.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 7 also gives employees the right to refrain from joining a union. Id.
34. Id. § 158(a)(5).

35. Id. § 158(b)(3).
36. Id. § 159(a) (emphasis added). Section 9(a) contains two provisos to the exclusive representation
requirement
Provided,That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms ofa collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provtdedfurther,That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Id. (emphases in original).
37. GORMAN, supra note 30, at 374; see also Medo Photo Supply v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944)
(holding that an employer may not bypass the bargaining representative and negotiate with individual
employees regarding terms and conditions of employment even though the employee(s) initiated the
negotiations).
38. GORMAN, supra note 30, at 375.
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minority subgroups within the union, the employer improperly assumes that
responsibility for itself and undermines the position of the union.39
The NLRA contains certain limitations on the employer's duty to bargain
exclusively with the employees' representative, however. First, the prohibition
on dealing directly with individual employees applies only to "rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."4 Outside
of those areas, the employer is free to negotiate directly with individual
employees provided that such bargaining does not directly infringe on matters
under negotiation or already contained in the collective bargaining agreement.4 Second, the prohibition applies only "for purposes of collective
bargaining. ' ' The NLRA does not proscribe dealings which cannot be
characterized as bargaining, such as informal discussions or interviews.43
Section 8(d) of the statute defines the term "collective bargaining" and
provides:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
44
the making of a concession
Once the parties have entered into an agreement governing the terms and
conditions of employment, § 8(d) limits either party's right to demand
negotiation on any matter contained in the contract.45 Sections 8(d) and
8(a)(5) combine to prohibit an-employer from unilaterally changing provisions
of a negotiated collective bargaining agreement.46 Where no agreement exists
or an agreement is in place but fails to address a particular issue, an employer
may not change working conditions without first providing the union with
notice and an opportunity to bargain over the proposed change. 47 Finally,

39. Id. at 379; see also General Elec. Co., 150 NLRB 192, 194 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
41. GORMAN, supra note 30, at 380; see also J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
43. GORMAN, supra note 30, at 380.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
45. Id. The limitation is intended to provide a certain measure of stability within the workplace. The
limitation, however, is not absolute. Specifically, § 8(d) provides:
[T]he duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to
any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such
modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under
the provisions of the contract.
Id. Thus, the parties may, by incorporating a reopener clause into their agreement, allow for rmdterm
bargaining on the specific subjects covered by the clause.
46. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
47. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (finding that
subcontracting of bargaining unit work constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the union is
therefore entitled to notice and opportunity to bargain over the subcontracting even though no contract
is in place).
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§ 8(d) explicitly grants a party to the labor agreement the right to refuse to
"discuss or agree to any modification" during the term of the collectivel
bargaining agreement.48
Unilateral action by an employer with respect to § 7 items is typically
referred to as a "per se" violation of the NLRA. In rare circumstances,
however, the employer may be justified in taking such action upon a showing
of good faith and business necessity 49 In the seminal case of NLRB v.
Katz,50 the Supreme Court affirmed an NLRB finding that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice by making unilateral changes in wages and
in its sick leave policy during contract negotiations with the union. The Court
implied that5 under some circumstances, however, such changes may be
permissible. '

Because § 9(a) confers upon the union the status of "exclusive representative," the union then assumes a concomitant duty to represent all employees
within the bargaining unit fairly and in good faith. 2 The union violates this
duty when it acts (or fails to act) based on, among other things, the
employee's race, 3 gender, 4 or membership status in the union.55 The
union's duty does not, however, demand identical treatment for all members.
in serving the
Rather, the union is given a "wide range of reasonableness
unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion. "56 The union's duty of fair
representation applies both to the negotiation and the administration of the
collective bargaining agreement.5 7
In addition to those obligations specifically set forth in the NLRA, the

courts have interpreted § 8(d) as imposing a duty on both parties to disclose
relevant information requested by the other so that the party may properly
perform its obligations under the Act. 58 The duty to disclose information is

48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
49. GORMAN, supra note 30, at 400; see also I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 596-98 (Patrick
Hardin ed., 1992).
50. 369 U.S. 736.
51. Specifically, the Court stated that "[unilateral action] will rarely be justified by any reason of
substance.
While we do not foreclos the possibility that there might be circumstances which the
Board could or should accept as excusing orjustifying unilateral action, no such case is presented here."
Id. at 747-48; see also I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 49, at 598 (noting that impasse,
necessity, and waiver are also grounds upon which an employer may base unilateral action).
52. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991); Ford v. Huffinan, 345 U.S. 330
(1953). An alternative formulation of the rule is that the union breaches its duty when its conduct toward
a bargaining unit member is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
190 (1967).
53. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The action in Steele was brought under the
Railway Labor Act rather than the NLRA. Nevertheless, its holding has been extended to race-based fair
representation claims under the NLRA. See Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
54. Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
55. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963).
56. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
57. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (citations omitted).
58. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (imposing upon the employer a duty to
disclose financial information to the union); Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic
Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (imposing a similar obligation upon
the union).
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not limited solely to the actual negotiation of the labor contract. Rather, it
extends throughout the term of the agreement to cover such union functions
as grievance arbitration."'
The parties' duty to disclose information is not absolute. Rather, courts will
engage in a case-by-case balancing of the interests of all the parties
involved-employer, union, and employee-to determine if disclosure is
warranted.60 In addition, outside areas such as wages and fringe benefits, the
union bears the burden of demonstrating the relevance of the information
requested.6 ' Finally, if the information is relevant but, because of employee
confidentiality reasons, may not be disclosed, the affected employee may
waive her privacy rights and allow disclosure.62
II. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ADA AND THE NLRA
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the duties imposed on
unions and employers by the ADA and the NLRA do not neatly coincide. In
fact, several areas of potential conflict exist. For example, an employer's duty
under the ADA to accommodate employees or applicants may conflict with
its duty to bargain under the NLRA-particularly if the employer unilaterally
implements an accommodation affecting a term or condition of employment.
In addition, an employer may be guilty of direct dealing in violation of the
exclusive representation principles of the NLRA if it consults directly with the
disabled employee, in the absence of the union, to determine potential
reasonable accommodations (as suggested by the ADA). If, on the other hand,
the employer decides to involve the union in the reasonable accommodation
process, how can it reconcile its ADA obligation to treat all employee medical
information as confidential with its duty to provide information under the
NLRA? Lastly, for the labor organization, how does the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement complicate the union's duty of fair representation owed
both to the disabled employee and to others in the unit whose interests may
be affected by any accommodations to which the union agrees?

The ADA may provide unions with another basis for obtaining an employer's financial information.
For example, the union could refuse to agree to an accommodation (e.g., reassignment to a vacant
position) on the ground that it violates some provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The union
may then propose an accommodation involving considerable expense to the employer (e.g., modification
of equipment). If the employer "pleads poverty," claiming that the union's proposed accommodation
would impose an undue financial hardship upon it, the employer would then be required (upon request)
to provide the union with information verifying its financial situation. If the union were legitimately
fulfilling its obligation to represent its member, requiring disclosure would not be problematic. If, on
the other hand, the union was acting with the sole objective of obtaining the employer's financial
statements, the employer would be justified in refusing to make disclosure. See I THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 49, at 659 (stating that the union's request must be in "good faith" and be
based on "at least one [justifiable] reason").
59. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).

60. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-20 (1979); Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153-54.
61. Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 314-15; GORMAN, supra note 30, at 413.
62. Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 317, 318 n.16.
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In August, 1992, then-General Counsel of the NLRB, Jerry Hunter, issued
a memorandum identifying areas of potential conflict between the NLRA and
the ADA and outlining generally how the NLRB would approach claims
raising issues under the two acts.63 This memorandum provides a useful
structure for analyzing the ADA/NLRA conflicts identified above. The NLRB
memorandum addressed several issues, including (1) potential conflicts
between an employer's NLRA § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) duty to bargain in good

faith and its duties under the ADA, and (2) potential conflicts between the
union's ADA obligations and its § 9(a) duty of fair representation."

A. Conflicts Between the ADA and the NLRA Duty to Bargain
The potential conflict between an employer's obligations under the ADA
and its duty to bargain under the NLRA is most evident when the employer
seeks to implement a reasonable accommodation that is inconsistent with the
provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement.65 In such 'a
situation, the employer may encounter a "Catch 22" of sorts. If the employer
unilaterally implements the proposed accommodation, it faces a possible

unfair labor practice charge under § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. On the other hand,
if the employer, relying on the collective bargaining agreement and the

NLRA, refuses to make the accommodation, it faces a potential ADA-based
discrimination charge by the disabled employee.
While the legislative history of the ADA indicates that the drafters were
aware of this potential conflict, it offers no real solutions. Both the House and
the Senate committee reports state that after the effective date of the ADA,

such conflicts may be avoided by including "a provision [within the collective
bargaining agreement] permitting the employer to take all actions necessary

to comply with this legislation.

66

Although this solution appears desirable,

some experts have questioned just how realistic it is. 67 First, even if the

63. General Counsel Memorandum GC 92-9 (Aug. 7, 1992) [hereinafter GC Memo] (copy on file
with the Indiana Law Journal); see also Jerry M. Hunter, Potential Conflicts Between Obligations
Imposed on Employers and Unions by the National Labor Relations Act and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 207 (1993).
64. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 1, 7. The Memorandum also briefly discusses concerted activities
regarding disability issues which affect mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Memorandum concludes
that such activities are concerted activities under § 7 of the NLRA, and that an employer would violate
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by retaliating, or threatening to retaliate, against employees for engaging in these

activities. Id. at 8-9.
65. For example, an employee may develop a disabling condition, necessitating a transfer to a lightduty position for which she lacks the requisite seniority under the collective bargaimng agreement.
66. S. REi. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32; H.R. RE'. No. 485, supra note 2, at 63, reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 346.
67. See, e.g., Enca F. Rottenberg, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Erosion of
Collective Rights?, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L., 179, 184 (1993); Patricia McConnell, Collective
Bargaining and NLRA Issues Raised by the Americans with Disabilities Act 10 (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 1993))
(copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal). But see Barbara Kamnmer Frankel, Comment, The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Erosionof Collective Rights?,22 Sw. U. L. REV. 257, 283 (stating that
"labor agreements, which do not include a clause permitting the employer to take all reasonable steps
necessary to comply with the ADA, cannot be upheld if to do so would thwart the public policy
established by the ADA").
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employer proposes that such a provision be included in the collective
bargaining agreement, under § 8(d) of the NLRA, the union is not obligated
to agree to it. Second, even though the union is also bound to uphold the
ADA, given the almost unfettered discretion such a provision would give to
the employer in fashioning accommodations which might affect terms and
conditions of employment, it is doubtful whether the union would agree to
it.6i Recall, however, that an employer who unilaterally implements a
reasonable accommodation which conflicts with the terms of its collective
bargaining agreement would violate § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA only if the
accommodation caused a "material, substantial or significant" change in
working conditions. 69 For example, Mr. Hunter stated in his Memorandum
that accommodations such as "putting [an employee's] desk on blocks,
providing a ramp, adding braille signage or providing an interpreter" would,
as a general rule, not result in a sufficient change in the terms and conditions
of employment to invoke the employer's duty to notify or bargain with the
union before implementing such accommodations. 70
An employer might argue that the ADA effectively invalidates any and all
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which have the effect of
preventing reasonable accommodation of a qualified employee's or applicant's
disabilities. 7' The employer may then rely on this interpretation of the Act
to justify unilaterally revising the offending clause in order to accommodate
an applicant or employee. The General Counsel's Memorandum, however,
does not support this particular reading of the Act. Distinguishing the
ADA-which gives the employer considerable discretion as to the accommodation ultimately implemented-from laws that mandate a change in working
conditions (to which an employer may unilaterally conform without violating
§ 8(a)(5)), 72 the Memorandum states that "[i]t seems unlikely that an
employer would be privileged to unilaterally change working conditions to
achieve compliance with the ADA without giving a union any notice or

68. McConnell, supra note 67, at 10.
69. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 2 (citing LaMousse, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 37, enforced, 703 F.2d
576 (9th Cir. 1983) (mem.) (holding that an employer who granted a five-minute increase in employee
break time did not violate § 8(a)(5) since the change was not material, substantial, or significant)).
An employer's ability to implement an accommodation without first bargaining with the union can
be a very important consideration since most accommodations are expected to be relatively minor-at
least in terms of dollars expended. See H.R. REP.No. 485, supra note 2, at 33, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 315 (citing testimony of Jay Rochlin, executive director of the President's Commission
on Employment of People with Disabilities, before the House Subcommittee on Select Education and
Employment Opportunities). This assumes, of course, that there is a positive correlation between the cost
of an accommodation and its effect on the workplace.
70. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 2-3.
71. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
72. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 3 (citing Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 1039 (1987)
(finding that an employer who banned food and drink in work areas to comply with OSHA did not
violate the NLRA), and Standard Candy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1964) (holding that an employer who
unilaterally raised wages to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage requirement
did not violate the NLRA)).
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opportunity to bargain."73 The Memorandum also points to the ADA's
implementing regulations, which provide that
[i]t may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under [the ADA) that
a challenged action is required or necessitated by another Federal law or
regulation, or that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an action
(including the provision of a particular reasonable accommodation) that
would otherwise be required. 74
These statements imply that an employer could rely on its NLRA obligation
to bargain with the union as a temporary justification for not making a
proposed accommodation. Whether that defense permanently relieves the
employer from making reasonable accommodation is uncertain.
The General Counsel's Memorandum raises, but does not fully answer, two
questions regarding the scope of the duty to bargain over a proposed
accommodation which is inconsistent with the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement:
(1)When a party to the contract (either an employer or a union) requests
bargaining over such a proposed accommodation, may the other party rely
on its right under Section 8(d) [of the NLRA] to refuse to discuss any
modification of the agreement during the term of the contract or, alternatively, does the creation of new legal duties under the ADA impose on both
[parties] a concomitant duty under the NLRA, at least, to bargain over the
proposed accommodation?
(2) If the parties are unable to reach agreement on an acceptable accommodation, does an employer violate its Section 8(d) obligation to refrain from
altering the contract without the consent of the union if it implements the
proposed accommodation over the union's objection?7"
73. Id. (emphasis in original). Mr. Hunter supports this statement by noting that the employer
possesses the defense of "undue hardship" to an ADA failure-to-accommodate discrimination claim. This
statement implies that the General Counsel perceives an unfair labor practice charge against an employer
as an undue hardship. Whether the courts or the EEOC hold a similar view remains to be seen.
Furthermore, both the ADA's legislative history and regulations provide that the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement are relevant to the undue hardship determination. Id. at 4; see also S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 63, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 345; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) app. at 414 (1994). Note, however, that none of these
authorities affirmatively state that the labor contract is itself a defense to such a charge.
The General Counsel's statement is strong evidence that the NLRB would find grounds to bring an
unfair labor practice charge against an employer who, in the process of accommodating a disabled
employee, makes such a unilateral change in working conditions. Therefore, employers would be welladvised to proceed very carefully before implementing any such change by fully considerng the impact
the proposed accommodation will have on the other employees covered by the collective bargaining
agreement and, if at all possible, by implementing the least intrusive accommodation that is feasible
under the situation.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1994); see also GC Memo, supra note 63, at 4. At this point one
should ask exactly what action the employee or applicant would be challenging. The challenge likely
would not focus on the fact that the employer discussed the accommodation with the union prior to
implementing (or not implementing) it-which is all that is required by the NLRA. Unlike federal safety
or environmental regulations, the NLRA does not require or necessitate that an employer maintain a
discriminatory condition orforbid any particular accommodation. It merely forbids the act of making
the accommodation which affects working conditions without first discussing it with the union.
75. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 5. These issues are addressed further infra at Part IV.B.
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Although the Memorandum does not provide answers to these questions, it
does clarify certain points. First, neither party to the labor contract has a right
under the NLRA to insist on adherence to terms which are facially discriminatory under the ADA.76 Second, a party may argue that, as to facially neutral
contract provisions, it should be able to rely on § 8(d) to refuse to engage in
midterm bargaining if another adequate accommodation exists which does not
conflict with the collective bargaining agreement. 77 The Memorandum states
that "further guidance will be forthcoming" as to the resolution of these two
unanswered questions.78
In determining reasonable accommodations under the ADA in light of the
employer's duty to avoid "direct dealing" under the NLRA, Mr. Hunter noted
that the ADA's regulations mandate that the employer confer with the
disabled employee to determine potential accommodations. 79 Although the
NLRA prohibits direct dealing on the part of the employer, § 9 does allow
employers to meet with employees to adjust grievances-provided the
resolution is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement and the union has been given the opportunity to be present during
the meeting." The General Counsel's Memorandum indicates that an
employer who arranges an accommodation which would affect working
conditions without negotiating the change with the union may be liable for
direct dealing.8 ' Thus, it appears that the employer should invite the union
to participate in any such discussions in order to comply with both the ADA
and § 9(a) of the NLRA. The EEOC agrees that the union should participate
in the discussions: "[T]he employer should consult with the union and try to
work out an acceptable accommodation."82
This solution, however, raises another conflict between the ADA and the
NLRA. As previously discussed, the NLRA requires that an employer disclose
to the union all relevant information which will enable it to perform its
functions under the collective bargaining agreement. The ADA, on the other
hand, requires that the employer maintain all employee medical information
in a confidential manner and limit disclosure only to certain individuals-none
of whom is the employee's bargaining representative. As to how the NLRB
will analyze disclosure of information issues, the General Counsel's

76. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 5. Given the prevalence of state disability discrimination laws and
the general concern employers have over discrimination charges, it is doubtful that many "facially
discriminatory" provisions actually exist.
77. Id. at 5 n.17 (noting that the appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 provides that the ADA does not
require the employer to provide the "best" possible accommodation). The Memorandum does not define
what is meant by "another adequate accommodation." Presumably, it means one that enables the
disabled employee or applicant to perform the essential functions of the job and does not violate the
collective bargaining agreement.
78. Id. at 5-6. As yet, no such guidance has been issued.
79. Id. at 6; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). For the exact wording of this provision, see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
81. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 6; see also supra note 36.
82. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 19, § 3.9(5).
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Memorandum reiterates the approach discussed earlier, under which the Board
balances the interests of the parties and attempts to fashion a remedy that
protects the interests of the involved parties.83

B. The Union's Duty of FairRepresentation
and Its Obligations Under the ADA
The General Counsel's Memorandum points out that the union's action or
inaction toward a disabled employee may raise two types of fair representation claims. First, the disabled employee may claim that the union breached

its duty by agreeing to a facially discriminatory contract provision or by
responding in a discriminatory manner to the employee's request that the
employer be allowed to implement a particular accommodation. Second,

nondisabled employees may raise a duty of fair representation claim if the
union acquiesces to a proposed accommodation which infringes upon their
rights under the collective bargaining agreement.8 4 The Memorandum directs
regional offices of the NLRB to evaluate such claims under "traditional

principles" of the duty of fair representation. 8
III. LOOKING FOR GUIDANCE
A. Conflicts or Opportunities?
Many practitioners and members of the academic community agree that, at
a minimum, the potential exists for conflict between the employer's and the

union's obligations under the ADA and the NLRA. 6 In contrast, at least one
commentator has suggested that the two acts do not conflict, but that they are
actually harmonious. 87 Several commentators who have considered the
interaction between the ADA and NLRA appear to favor an approach which
holds that rights and obligations under one statute automatically trump those
under the other or, at least, are deserving of special preference when balanced

83. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 7; see also supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
84. GC Memo, supra note 63, at 7-8.
85. Id. at 8. For a discussion of the standards applied to fair representation claims, see supra notes
52-57 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 1991 DET. C.L. REV. 925; Hunter, supra
note 63; Jules L. Smith, Accommodating the Americans with DisabilitiesAct to Collective Bargaining
Obligations Under the NLRA, 18 EMP. REL. L.J. 273 (1992); Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump
Card: May an EmployerRefuse to ReasonablyAccommodate Under the ADA by Claiminga Collective
Bargaining Obligation?, 9 LAB. LAW. 71 (1993); R. Bales, Note, Title I of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: ConflictsBetween ReasonableAccommodation and Collective Bargaining,2 CORNELL

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161 (1992); Frankel, supra note 67; Rottenberg, supra note 67; McConnell, supra
note 67.
87. David S. Doty, Comment, The Impact of Federal Labor Policy on the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct of 1990: Collective BargainingAgreements in a New Era of Civil Rights, 1992 B.Y.U.

L. REv. 1055 (1992) (asserting that the ADA recognizes the validity of collective bargaining in
resolving employment disputes).
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against the other.8 8 Other commentators recommend that a more genuine
form of balancing be employed to resolve conflicts which arise under the two
statutes. 89

Those favoring the former approach have concluded that either the ADA or
the NLRA furthers more important rights and social policies than those
furthered by the other statute. 90 Other commentators argue that, from an
administrative standpoint, this either/or approach would be less confusing and
easier to implement. 9' While it is difficult to argue with the notion that such
a per se rule would provide more certainty and administrative ease, this
position ignores the realities of modem industrial life and the express

language of the ADA and its accompanying regulations. Regardless of which
rights one may feel deserve more protection, both of these statutes are
essential within their spheres of coverage. Discrimination against the disabled
is a significant social problem with huge costs that must be eradicated. In

addition, the rights and protections created by federal labor laws have helped
bring about significant social and economic equality. These laws have
managed to co-exist with, and even support, numerous other civil rights
statutes in the past, and there is no reason to believe that they will not
continue to do so in the future. Therefore, given the legislative history and the
policy considerations behind the ADA, and the importance of both the ADA
and the NLRA in protecting worker rights, a balancing approach should be
employed, since such a technique will better effectuate the goals and
objectives of both statutes.

88. See Smith, supra note 86, at 282-83 (recommending that deference should be given to collective
bargaining agreements); Bales, supra note 86, at 192-93, 203 (arguing that the ADA duty of reasonable
accommodation should prevail over the NLRA even if an accommodation contravenes the collective
bargaining agreement); Frankel, supra note 67, at 276-77, 282-83 (arguing that ADA provisions should
prevail over clauses in the collective bargaining agreement which conflict with the goals of the ADA);
Rottenberg, supra note 67, at 186 (arguing that the ADA should not be allowed to adversely impact
NLRA rights and obligations).
89. Ervin, supra note 86, at 960-62 (arguing that, except in rare circumstances, the ADA duty of
reasonable accommodation should prevail over inconsistent terms in the collective bargaining
agreement); Stahlhut, supra note 86, at 93-95 (recommending that courts proceed on a case-by-case
basis by balancing the rights of the disabled individual seeking accommodation against those whose
collective bargaining rights are in jeopardy).
90. See Bales, supra note 86, at 203 (arguing that reassignment in contravention of the collective
bargaining agreement poses "few significant impediments" to collective bargaining, and that "disability
discrimnation, like race and sex discrimination, should be non-negotiable"); Frankel, supranote 67, at
260 ("[I]n order to implement the national policy of prohibiting discrimination [on the basis of
disability], it is essential that the ADA provisions prevail over provisions in collective bargaining
agreements which thwart the goals of the ADA.').
91. See Smith, supra note 86, at 277 (arguing that unless deference is afforded to collective
bargaining agreements, "chaos" will result in the adminstration of these agreements and the parties will
be "burdened by a flood of litigation").
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B. Looking for Guidance
Although Congress recognized the potential conflicts between the ADA and
the NLRA, it failed to provide any clear answers to the dilemma.92 There
are, however, several areas upon which to draw in formulating a framework
for resolving ADAINLRA conflicts. First, both the legislative history and the
implementing regulations make it clear that the Act is modeled upon the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").93 Thus, a review of the
case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act may clarify the role that
Congress and the EEOC expect collective bargaining agreements to play under
the ADA. Second, the legislative history and the implementing regulations of
the ADA strongly suggest a balancing approach. Third, by comparing how the
ADA, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 94
each deal with seniority provisions in collective bargaining agreements, one
can see that the ADA shuns the per se approaches discussed above.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability-based discrimination by any program or activity receiving federal funds." A fairly substantial
and consistent body of case law has developed under § 504 addressing the
issues of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in a unionized
workplace. Courts uniformly hold that § 504 does not require employers to
accommodate disabled employees if doing so would violate the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement.
One of the first cases to address an employer's competing obligations under
the NLRA and § 504 was Daubert v. United States Postal Service.96 The
plaintiff in Daubertwas discharged after a back condition rendered her unable
to perform all the duties of her position. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint and held that the U.S.
Postal Service had articulated a legitimate business justification for failing to
92. It is reasonably safe to assume that the lack of a determinative answer reflects a conscious
omission by Congress. Had Congress stated that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
provide an automatic and complete defense to a contradictory request for reasonable accommodation,
the protections provided by the ADA would be seriously weakened. On the other hand, if Congress had
provided that a disabled individual's rights under the ADA always trump the labor agreement, it would
have opened the door for substantial abuse of the collective bargaining process and would have run the
risk of alienating organized labor-a well-organized contingent of voters.
93.29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 2 ("The
ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations
unless it would result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business.'); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)
app. at 395 (1994) (stating that Congress intended that the relevant case law developed under the
Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term "disability"); id. § 1630.15(d) app. at 414
(analogizing the concept of "undue hardship" to that which was developed under the Rehabilitation Act
as opposed to Title VII).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
95. Id. § 794(a).
96. 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).
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reassign the plaintiff or restructure her position: such action was foreclosed
by the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.97
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on its conclusory statement that the
Postal Service's obligations under the labor agreement "clearly articulate[d]
a legitimate business reason for Daubert's discharge."'
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Jasany v.
United States Postal Service 99 The court held that a low-semonty employee,
who suffered from a congenital vision disorder which interfered with his
ability to operate a letter sorting machine, was not "handicapped" as that term
is defined in the Rehabilitation Act. In the court's view, the plaintiffs
impairment did not substantially limit him in a major life activity ...The
court noted that even if the plaintiff were handicapped, he would not have
been entitled to reassignment under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, which limited reassignment to those employees who had suffered
job-related injuries. The court stated that "[a]n employer cannot be required
to accommodate a handicapped employee by restructuring a job in a manner
which would usurp the legitimate rights of other employees in a collective
bargaining agreement." 01
Finally, in Carter v. Tisch,"°2 an asthmatic post office custodian brought
suit when he was discharged as a result of an inability to perform the essential
functions of his position. He claimed that the Postal Service, which had
temporarily assigned him to a light-duty position prior to terminating his
employment, unlawfully discriminated against him by failing to permanently
assign him to light-duty work. The EEOC found no discrimination, and the
district court agreed on the ground that the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement precluded the plaintiffs request." 3 The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the Postal Service had no duty to accommodate the plaintiff by
assigning him to permanent light duty 104
Interestingly, the court's decision rested partly on dictum from a U.S.
Supreme Court decision which stated that, under § 504 of the Rehabilitation

97. Id. at 1369, 1372.
98. Id. at 1370.

99. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 1248-50; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.703, 1613.708 (1994). The Jasany court added that,
even assuming the employee were handicapped, he was not otherwise qualified for his position since
visual acuity was required for the position. As such, the Postal Service was not required to accommodate
him by eliminating one of the essential functions of his position (i.e., running the mail sorting machine).
Jasany,755 F.2d at 1250.
101. Jasany,755 F.2d at 1251-52 (citing, among others, Daubert,733 F.2d at 1367). Although this
was not the primary basis for the court's holding, it is interesting to note that no evidence was
introduced which showed that accommodating the plaintiff by restructuring his position or reassigning
him to another job would have disappointed any of his co-workers' expectations.
The approach discussed infra at Part IV.B recommends that whether a co-worker's expectations
would actually be disappointed (as opposed to viewing the matter in the abstract) is a relevant factor
in determining whether an employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation or was unjustified in
unilaterally imposing such an accommodation.
102. 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 466-67.
104. Id. at 469.
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Act, an employer is under no duty to reassign an employee who can no longer
perform his job.'1 5 As additional support for its decision, the court of
appeals pointed to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which
limited reassignment to employees with five or more years of seniority 106
The court also noted that, even if reassignment were a permissible accommodation, unless the plaintiff could show that "the [collective bargaining]
agreement had the effect or intent of discrimination" the employer was under
no duty to provide such an accommodation.0 7
These cases show how judicial treatment of the employer's duty to make
reasonable accommodation has severely weakened the protections provided to
disabled individuals under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act-at least in a union
setting. As such, it is not surprising that Congress, in drafting the ADA, added
additional safeguards' 8 and did not rely solely upon the judicial interpretation of § 504. For example, the Senate Report accompanying the ADA states
that the concept of undue hardship "is derived from and should be applied
consistently with interpretations by Federal agencies applying the term set

forth in regulations implementing sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act." 0 9 This statement supports the notion that Congress disagreed with
past judicial treatment of the undue hardship issue. Nevertheless, it would be
premature to conclude that statements such as this evince a congressional

intent that the rights of the disabled should always prevail over an employer's
defense grounded in the collective bargaining agreement. If Congress had
intended such a result, it could have easily said so. °

105. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19, rehg denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
106. Carter,822 F.2d at 467. The court stated that "[the Postal Service] was bound by a collective
bargaining agreement. Reassigning Carter to permanent light duty, when he was not entitled to one of
a limited number of light-duty positions, might have interfered with the rights of other employees under
the collective bargaining agreement." Id. (emphasis added). The court also cited Jasany and Daubert
in support of its holding that employers are not required to make accommodations which might usurp
the expectations of other workers under the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
107. Id. at 469; see also Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789 (1st Cir. 1989). The Shea court relied in
part on Carter in affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment against the employee's
discrimination claim for failure to make reasonable accommodation. The plaintiff in Shea requested
reassignment in violation of the seniority-based job bidding provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.
108. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA includes reassignment as a potential accommodation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i).
109. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 36 (emphasis added). But ef 29 C.F.RL § 1630.2(g) app. at
395 (stating that "Congress intended that the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act
be generally applicable to the term 'disability") (emphasis added).
110. Note also that although the EEOC has generally been more willing to find handicap
discrimination despite the employer's obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, the agency
has not been entirely consistent in ruling that the disabled employee's rights under the Rehabilitation
Act automatically prevail. Compare Jasany,755 F.2d at 1248 (in which the EEOC found in favor of
the employee on a handicap discrimination claim) with Carter,822 F.2d at 466 (where the EEOC found
no such discrimination).

1288

2VDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:1271

2. TWA v Hardison
Only one U.S. Supreme Court case has dealt with the issue of reasonable
accommodation within a unionized workplace. In TWA v. Hardison,"' an
employee brought a religious discrimination suit against his employer and
union under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Hardison claimed
that the defendants had illegally discriminated against him by refusing to
modify his work schedule to accommodate his religious practices. Both the
statute and the implementing regulations required the employer to make
"reasonable accommodations" for the religious needs of its employees unless
'13
doing so would create an "undue hardship."
Initially, Hardison was able to avoid any conflicts between his work
schedule and his religious observances because the collective bargaining
agreement granted shift preference to employees based on their accumulated
seniority Problems surfaced, however, when he transferred to another
department, thereby forfeiting his seniority Although TWA was willing to
bypass the collective bargaining agreement and allow Hardison to work a shift
which did not conflict4with his religious practices, the union refused to permit
the accommodation."
The court of appeals found in favor of Hardison based on two grounds:
(1) TWA had failed to make reasonable accommodation for his religious
practices; and (2) TWA had actually rejected three reasonable alternatives
which would have satisfied its obligations without imposing an undue
hardship." 5 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that, not only had TWA
made reasonable efforts to accommodate Hardison, but that each of the court
of appeals' proffered alternatives would have imposed an undue hardship
"within the meaning of the statute and EEOC guidelines."'' 6 With respect
to TWA's obligations under the collective bargaining agreement, the Court
stated:
[N]either a collective-bargaining contract nor a seniority system may be
employed to violate [Title VII], but we do not believe that the duty to
accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise
valid agreement. Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and
enforceable agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of
our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally included
in these contracts. Without a clear and express indication from Congress,

111. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
112.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i).
113. Hardison,432 U.S. at 66; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1994).
114. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67-68.
115. Id. at 76. The proposed accommodations were as follows:
First, within the framework of the seniority system, TWA could have permitted Hardison to
work a four-day week, utilizing in his place a supervisor or another worker
Second[,]
the company could have filled Hardison's Saturday shift from other available personnel
competent to do the job
Third, TWA could have arranged a "swap between Hardison and
another employee either for another shift or for the Sabbath days."

116. Id. at 77.
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we cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon seniority
system must
give way when necessary to accommodate religious obser7
vances."
The Court added: "'This Court has long held that employee expectations
arising from a seniority system agreement may be modified by statutes
furthering a strong policy interest.""'" Relying on "the strong congressional
policy against discrimination," the Court refused to interpret Title VII as
requiring the abrogation of some employees' seniority rights in order to
accommodate the religious needs of other employees:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommodation"
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift preference of some
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that
Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.ii 9
Finally, the Court held that "[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimis
cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship. '"'2
In formulating Title I of the ADA, Congress explicitly rejected the de
minimis standard of Hardison. According to the legislative historyThe Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enumerated
by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison are not applicable to this
legislation. In Hardison, the Supreme Court concluded that under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate
persons with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more
than a de minimis cost for the employer.' 2 '
The Committee's emphasis on the cost aspect of the Hardison decision
leaves open the possibility that the portion of Hardison discussing collective
bargaining rights and their relationship to the duty of reasonable accommodation may still be good law under the ADA. Nevertheless, given the "clear and
express" indications of Congress that collective bargaining agreements are
only one factor to be considered in the undue hardship analysis, it is doubtful
that the Hardison standard still applies.
C. The Legislative History and Regulations of the ADA
The ADA's legislative history and implementing regulations indicate that
its drafters did not intend for rights under either the ADA or the NLRA to
consistently trump the obligations under the other, but instead intended that
117. Id. at 79 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 79 n.12 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976)).
119. Id. at 81. The Court further supported its conclusion by pointing to § 703(h) of Title VII, which
exempts bona fide seniority systems from certain Title VII requirements. For a further discussion of
§ 703(h), see infra Part III.D.
120. Hardison,432 U.S. at 84 (italics in original).
121. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The House Report
accompanying the ADA contains an identical statement. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 68,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 350-51.
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the two should be balanced against one another. For example, the committee
reports issued by both the House and Senate state:
The section 504 regulations provide that "a recipient's obligation to
comply with this subpart [employment] is not affected by any inconsistent
term of any collective bargaining agreement to which it is a party"
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant, however, in
determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable. For example,
if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees
with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in
determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an
employee with a disability without seniority to that job.122
The House Report adds that "the [labor] agreement would not be determinative on the issue."' 2 3 This language clearly evinces a legislative intent that
the terms of the labor agreement do not automatically prevail over the
individual's rights under the ADA or preclude a covered entity from its
obligation to make reasonable accommodation. Likewise, it indicates that the
employee's ADA right to reasonable accommodation does not automatically
trump the rights and obligations imposed by the collective bargaining
agreement. Therefore, to argue, as some commentators have, 124 that the
rights and obligations under the ADA or the NLRA should receive favorable
treatment when they conflict with the rights and duties under the other statute
is to ignore Congress' intent.
In discussing the resolution of disparate impact claims under the ADA (in
which a disabled applicant or employee alleges that a facially neutral
provision of the labor contract has the effect (but not necessarily the purpose)
of discriminating against her), the House and Senate reports further stress that
a balancing-type approach be employed: "In other situations, the relevant
question would be whether the collective bargaining agreement articulates
legitimate business criteria. For example, if the collective bargaining
agreement includes job duties, it may be taken into account as a factor in
determining whether a given task is an essential function of the job."'25
The EEOC regulations implementing the ADA follow the same general
approach outlined above: neither the ADA nor the collective bargaining
agreement should automatically prevail when the two come into conflict. For
example, with respect to possible defenses to a request for reasonable
accommodation, the regulatory appendix provides: "[A]n employer could
demonstrate that the provision of a particular accommodation would be unduly
122. S. REP. No. 116, supranote 2, at 32 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
see also H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 63, reprntedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 345.

The fact that the covered entity's obligations to comply with the ADA are not affected by the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement does not necessarily mean that the agreement must yield to the
ADA, however.
123. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 345.
124. See supra notes 88, 90-91, and accompanying text.
125. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 485, supra note 2, at 63,
reprnted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 345 (emphasis added). The House Report then adds, "Again,
however, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue." Id.
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disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of its business. The
terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant to this determination."'2 6 The mere fact that a reasonable accommodation negatively affects
the morale of other employees will not be sufficient to establish undue
hardship, however.' 27
The ADA's legislative history and regulations also favor individualized
determinations rather than per se rules. For example, as to whether an
employee or an applicant is a qualified individual with a disability, the Senate
Report states: "[T]hls legislation prohibits use of a blanket rule excluding
people with certain disabilities except in very limited situations where in all
cases [the] physical condition by its very nature would prevent the person
from performing the essential functions of the job, even with reasonable
accommodations."'2 Similarly, both the House and Senate reports state that
"the decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one
which must be determined based on the particular facts of the individual
case."'2 9 Finally, to further reinforce the notion that per se rules are not to
be adopted, the EEOC's regulations state that "[w]hether a particular
accommodation would impose an undue
hardship for a particular employer is
130
determined on a case by case basis."'
Given the general policy in the legislative history and the regulations
favoring case-by-case, fact-based, individualized assessments, it would be
anomalous to require an employer to engage in such an exercise only to have
a court or an administrative agency apply a per se rule to the very same
situation and hold that either the employee's ADA rights or the employer's
collective bargaining obligations automatically control. Only balancing the
rights and obligations under each statute will assure that these acts continue
to serve their proper role in protecting individual employee rights.
D. Comparing the ADA to Other Civil Rights Statutes
Comparing the provisions of the ADA with those of Title VII and the
ADEA, it is evident that Congress did not intend for the collective bargaining
agreement to override the rights and obligations created by the ADA. Both
Title VII and the ADEA contain specific exemptions for seniority systemsone of the most common features of collective bargaining agreements. Title
VII includes a specific exemption for bona fide seniority agreements which
have the effect of discriminating against covered individuals:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system

126. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) app. at 414; see also supra note 21 (discussing the relevance of the

collective bargaining agreement in determining whether a job function is essential).
127. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) app. at 415.
128. S. RP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 27.
129. Id. at 31; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 62, reprmted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 344-45.
130. 29 C.F.R § 1630.15(d) app. at 414 (emphasis added).
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provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ongin.'
The ADEA contains a similar provision:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization
to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA], except that
no such seniority system
shall require or permit the involuntary
retirement of any individual
because of the age of such individual.'
Without question, Congress was aware of these seniority-based exceptions
to Title VII and the ADEA when it drafted the ADA. The fact that Congress
chose not to include a similar exemption under the ADA is strong evidence
that collective bargaining rights do not automatically supersede those provided
to individual employees under the ADA. As stated previously, however, the
same can be said for ADA rights. If Congress had intended for them to
automatically prevail over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, it
could very easily have said so.
IV A PROPOSED BALANCING APPROACH
To conclude that the ADA shuns per se .determinations and requires a
genuine ad hoc balancing of ADA and NLRA rights and obligations is only
the beginning. The more difficult question is what factors must be considered
when balancing those rights and obligations and why
A. An Ounce of Prevention
Obviously, the need to balance interests will not arise until an employer
decides to implement an accommodation which conflicts with the collective
bargaining agreement. If a nonconflicting accommodation exists, the employer
should choose it. 33 Given the flexible approach adopted by the statute and
the regulations, the wide discretion the employer has in making reasonable
accommodation, 134 and the interests of all parties in avoiding conflict, the
vast majority of cases should be resolved without allowing ADA obligations
to conflict with the parties' NLRA obligations or the expectations of other
employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement. If, however, a
potential accommodation exists which adequately meets the disabled
employee's needs and which does not conflict with the collective bargaining
agreement, but the employer instead chooses to implement an accommodation
which runs counter to the labor agreement, the union would be justified in

131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ez2(h).

132. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2).
133. StahIhut, supra note 86, at 93.
134. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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labor practice charge or breach of contract action against
bringing an unfair
3
the employer. To avoid conflicts such as these, the employer and the union could take any
number of preemptive steps. First, to help guard against the unilateral
implementation of an accommodation by the employer,"3 6 the parties might
enter into a "memorandum of understanding" outlining the way in which they
will handle accommodation requests from disabled employees. 37 Alternatively, the parties could incorporate a "reopener" clause into the labor contract
which would allow them to engage in midterm negotiations over accommodation requests. Of course, the party wishing to include such a provision
(generally the employer) would likely have to make certain concessions in
order to secure its inclusion in the labor agreement. The costs of these
concessions would have to be weighed carefully against both the probability
and the cost of potential discrimination, unfair labor practice, or breach of
contract claims. Another challenge would be to fashion a provision that is
both broad enough and flexible enough to cover most (if not all) of the
potential situations which might arise.
A related preemptive measure the parties could take would be to incorporate

the notion of reasonable accommodation directly into the collective bargaining
agreement's job promotion/job transfer provision. The following example

illustrates one possible framework:
XX. PROMOTIONS AND JOB TRANSFERS
Other factors such as skill, knowledge, training, and ability being
equal, seniority shall be the determining factor in making promotion or jobtransfer decisions. However, in the event of a promotion or a job-transfer
decision prompted by a request for reasonable accommodation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, provided that the employee requesting the
accommodation possesses at least 75% of the seniority required for the
position, that individual shall be given first priority as to the position. If
no employee bidding for the promotion or the transfer meets the requisite
seniority requirements, the employee requesting
accommodation shall be
8
given priority regardless of her seniority."

135. Rottenberg, supra note 67, at 189. A breach of contract action is based on § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
136. In his Memorandum, Mr. Hunter does not definitively classify such action as a § 8(a)(5) unfair
labor practice-at least in the context of an employer implementing the accommodation after discussing
the matter with the union and failing to reach agreement.
137. A memorandum of understanding is an agreement between an employer and a union which
modifies or adds to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Such agreements are binding
upon the parties and typically deal with a single issue. Rottenberg, supra note 67, at 187 n.52; see also
Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the parties had entered into
a memorandum of understanding governing geographic transfers which provided that local economic
conditions and "EEOC factors" were valid concerns in making transfer determinations, provided that
the employee had at least one year of service).
A well-thought-out memorandum of understanding would serve to minimize or eliminate many of
the transaction costs associated with midterm bargaining or unfair labor practice claims-both monetary
(e.g., legal fees, lost work time on the part of both management and union representatives, etc.) and
nonmonetary (e.g., increased employer-union tension, decreased employee morale, etc.).
138. The specific provisions of this type of clause could be altered to fit the needs of the parties. For
example, the employer could be given discretion in determining the relative skills and abilities of the

1294

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:1271

It is difficult to imagine why an employer would not want to somehow
involve the union in the accommodation decision-regardless of the cost of
the accommodation or the ADA's confidentiality requirements. Aside from the
obvious benefit of helping to avoid breach of contract or unfair labor practice
claims, involving the union in the decision would help foster a cooperative
atmosphere in the workplace and, given the vast experience which unions
have in balancing the diverse interests of their members, the union's
assistance may very well prove invaluable. In addition, because the employee
desires to continue working, it would seem to be in her best interest to permit
the union's involvement in the process by waiving, if necessary, the
39
confidentiality requirements of the ADA.
As another preemptive step, the parties should perform a job analysis for
each of the various positions in the bargaining unit. To determine how close
the job-physical requirement nexus really is, this analysis would focus on the
requirements for, and the various tasks performed within, each job classification covered by the collective bargaining agreement. The results of this
analysis would then be incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement
by way of position descriptions. If a discrimination claim should later arise,
the EEOC has indicated that it will consider these job descriptions as evidence
40
of whether a given function is truly "essential" to the job in question.
B. Resolving ADA/NLRA Claims Via a Balancing Approach
The General Counsel Memorandum discussed in Part III provides considerable insight into how the NLRB will approach disputes implicating the ADA
and the NLRA. Aside from the regulations and the Technical Assistance
Manual, the EEOC has yet to issue further guidance on how it views the role
of the collective bargaining agreement in ADA complaints. On November 16,
1993, the General Counsel of the NLRB and the Acting Chairman of the
EEOC issued a "Memorandum of Understanding" which outlines the

employees (as is usually the case), or that determinatibn could be made in conjunction with the union.
Alternatively, the percent-of-semority provision could be raised, lowered, or eliminated completely if
the parties so desired. The critical point is not necessarily the specific provisions of the clause but rather
that the employer and tie union consider beforehand how to address accommodation requests. For a
useful discussion of the promotion, transfer, and assignment clauses in collective bargaining agreements,
see UNION CONTRACT CLAusEs 481-99 (1954).
139. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. If the employee refused to waive her ADA
privacy rights, the union might still be able to participate in the accommodation process if the
information can be structured so as to avoid disclosure of any sensitive material. See also Doty, supra
note 87, at 1067 n.61 (suggesting that, although many disabled employees seek accommodation for
nonmedical conditions, the ADA prohibition applies only to the results of "medical examinations").
140. See EEOC TECHNICAL AssIsTANcE MANUAL, supra note 19, § 7.11 (noting, however, that the
inclusion of position descriptions is not determinative); Doty, supranote 87, at 1059; supranote 21 and
accompanying text.
While such an analysis would not necessarily foreclose all potential disputes which could arise, it may
help avoid some problems by pointing out areas where jobs could be restructured before a request for
accommodation is actually made. In addition, it is likely that m investigating a claim, the EEOC, the
NLRB, or some other factfinder would look more positively on a before-the-fact analysis of job factors
than on an analysis put together after a claim or charge has been filed.
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procedures for coordinating enforcement of Title I of the ADA and § 8 of the
NLRA.'
Unfortunately, the memorandum does not add any substantive
guidance as to how the two agencies will resolve complaints. It merely
stipulates that whenever either agency receives a charge or a complaint-the
determination of which will turn in part upon an interpretation by the other
agency-it will consult with the other agency before issuing a final determi-

nation. 142
Given the overlapping nature of the various claims or charges discussed
above, it is likely that the courts and administrative agencies will adopt
similar approaches to resolving disputes. As such, the balancing approach
outlined below would generally apply to both unfair labor charges brought
before the NLRB and discrimination claims brought before the EEOC or a
court. 43 The two questions raised, but not answered, in the General
Counsel's Memorandum discussed in Part III will help illustrate the proposed
balancing approach.
The first question is whether either party may rely on its § 8(d) right to
refuse to discuss midterm modifications to the labor agreement when the other
party requests bargaining over a proposed accommodation which in some way
impacts upon the collective bargaining agreement. 144 In other words, does
the ADA impose a duty upon the parties to bargain over proposed accommodations? The answer to this question must be "yes."
First, in the vast majority of situations, the employee will initially approach
her employer to request some type of accommodation for her disability Thus,
under the typical scenario, the employer will initiate discussions with the
union regarding potential accommodations. The union then has two options.
It could refuse to discuss the accommodation relying on § 8(d) of the NLRA.
Alternatively, the union could enter into discussions with the employer
regarding which of the potential accommodations would be most "reasonable"
given the employee's condition, the employer's situation, and the effect the
accommodation would have on other employees covered by the collective
bargaining agreement. The NLRA merely requires that the union discuss the
matter-it is under no obligation to agree to any of the employer's proposals.

141. Memorandum of Understanding Between the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, repnnted in The Americans with
Disabilities Act Manual (BNA) 70:1019 (Dec. 1993).

142. Id.
143. Many collective bargaining agreements also empower arbitrators to resolve discrimination claims
involving bargaining unit employees. One federal court recently indicated its receptivity to contractbased arbitration of disability discrimination claims. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994) (dismissing the plaintiff's disability discrimination claim for
failure to submit the dispute to mandatory arbitration as stipulated in the collective bargaining
agreement). But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that the plaintiff's
prior submission of his race discrimination claim to arbitration did not foreclose his cause of action
under Title VII, and that Title VII rights may not be prospectively waived as they form no part of the
collective bargaining process).
144. Recall that the employer is obligated to discuss the matter with the union only if the change
would materially affect wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment. See supra note 69
and accompanying text.
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If the union were to refuse to discuss the matter with the employer, it may
have failed to act in "good faith" or in a "reasonable" manner and thus may
have violated its duty to fairly represent the employee.'4 5
In addition, the employee may have an independent ADA claim against the
union for intentional discrimination. 4 6 Aside from the union's duty of fair
representation, a second reason for imposing a duty on the union to discuss
proposed accommodations is Congress' desire to create a national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against the disabled.'47 By including labor
organizations within the definition of a "covered entity" and outlawing
discriminatory collective bargaining agreements, Congress effectively
"drafted" unions into its ongoing war against disability-based discrimination.
If the union were allowed to stand behind its § 8(d) right to refuse midterm
discussions when an accommodation is proposed, it would not be fulfilling its
role in eradicating discrimination and Congress' objectives would be seriously
undermined.
Obviously, if the situation were reversed and the employer refused to
consider the employee's or the union's request to discuss the accommodation,
the employee would have a discrimination claim against the employer. 4 ' In
addition, if the employer and the union had previously incorporated a
memorandum of understanding or a reopener provision into the labor
agreement, the union would have a breach of contract claim against the
employer. 4 9 Therefore, under this scenario, not only is it an employer's
duty to bargain over the accommodation, but it is in its best interest to do so.
The second question posed by the General Counsel's Memorandum is
whether an employer, after negotiating and failing to reach agreement with the
union over a proposed accommodation, violates its § 8(d) obligation not to
take unilateral action when it implements the accommodation over the union's
50
objection. The answer to this question is considerably more difficult.

145. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the union's duty of fair
representation.
The union could defend against a breach of fair representation claim by arguing that it considered
the interests of all of its members-including those of the complaining employee-when it initially
negotiated the collective bargaining agreement. This argument would be persuasive if the parties had
somehow addressed accommodation decisions in the agreement or if the employee had been, in fact,
been disabled at the time contract negotiations took place. If, however, the parties did not address the
accommodation issue, or if the employee became disabled during the term of the agreement (thereby
changing her interests), the union's argument would be substantially weakened. Its best course of action
would then be to discuss the matter with the employer. By refusing to discuss the matter with the
employer, the union has not merely "treated two of its member employees differently" because it has
given no consideration whatsoever to the interests of the disabled employee. By at least discussing and
considenng the matter, the union has accounted for the interests of all of its constituents and satisfied
its duty of fair representation.
146. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). In order to prevail on such a claim, the employee would
have to prove that the union failed to take action because of her disability status and not because of the
union's coincidental obligation to its other members.
147. Id. § 12101(b)(1).

148. See id. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
149. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
150. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962) ("While we do not foreclose the possibility
that there might be circumstances which the [NLRB] could or should accept as excusing or justifying
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To make this determination, courts, administrative agencies, and arbitrators
must consider the totality of the circumstances and balance the rights and
duties of the parties involved.' Specifically, the trier of fact must consider
(1) the employer's interest in avoiding an ADA discrimination charge or an
unfair labor practice charge under the NLRA; (2) the union's desire to protect
the bargaining agreement and the interests of its membership; (3) the specific
type of accommodation at issue and whether, and to what extent, the
accommodation affects the rights of other bargaining unit employees; and

(4) the interest of the disabled employee in maintaining her livelihood.'52
For example, an employer may desire to reassign a disabled employee to a

currently vacant position for which she does not meet the requisite seniority
requirements.' 53 If reassignment is truly the only accommodation that will

satisfy the disabled employee's needs, this would cut in favor of upholding

the employer's unilateral action. 5 4 On the other hand, if other, less intrusive
options exist,155 the employer's unilateral action would seem less justified
and the union could file an unfair labor practice charge.5 6
unilateral action, no such case is presented here."). The situation described above may be such a
situation. In addition, while most cases involve unilateral employer actions which affect all, or a large
part, of the bargaining unit, the situation described above affects only one or two employees.
151. Other approaches to balancing the interests of the parties can be found in Ervin, supra note 86,
at 969, and Stahlhut, supra note 86, at 93-96.
152. To be sure, the focus of the ADA is on the interests of the employer and the disabled employee.
However, given that one of the statutory factors is "the type of operation
of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce," it seems reasonable to consider
the interests of the union and the co-workers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(iv); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(p)(2)(iv).
153. Reassignment to a vacant position is the only type of accommodation suggested by the ADA.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The Act does not require an employer to "bump" another employee to
accommodate a disabled individual. On the other hand, the Act does not forbid such action either. See
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32.
154. Such cases will indeed be rare given the latitude that tie Act provides in formulating
accommodations. In addition, in this age of "leaner" organizations, fewer companies leave positions
"vacant" for any length of time. Such positions are either quickly filled or eliminated. For a discussion
of how the parties may avoid such problems before they. arise, see also supra Part IV.A.
155. For example, perhaps a modified work schedule or some type of mechanical assistance would
be sufficient to enable the employee to perform her job.
156. The questions still remain as to what exactly is a "reasonable" accommodation and how does
one determine whether one accommodation is more or less "intrusive" than another. Assuming that the
accommodation succeeds in enabling the employee to perform the essential functions of the job, and
given the ADA's emphasis on the economic impact an accommodation has on an employer, the logical
starting point of the "reasonableness" analysis is the economic aspects of the accommodation. Those
accommodations which effectively enable the employee to perform her job, and, at the same time, are
less costly, are presumptively more reasonable. The "intrusiveness" question, on the other hand, focuses
on the impact that the proposed accommodation has on other bargaining unit employees. Those
accommodations with a larger negative impact on other employees are, per se, more intrusive. The two
concepts, however, are not mutually exclusive. For example, a relatively inexpensive accommodation
could so intrude on the interests of other employees that its implementation would be unreasonable. The
discussion, infra, addresses such situations.
Considerable difficulty will arise in those situations in which two or more accommodations will each
succeed in meeting the employee's needs but one accommodation entails an immediate monetary outlay
(e.g., specialized tools) while the other does not (e.g., modified work schedules or job reassignment).
The latter, however, might be more intrusive on the interests of other employees than the former. In
such cases, the relative bargaining strength of the parties (employer and union) will largely determine
which accommodation is chosen. The employer should keep in mind that although one accommodation
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The factfinder must also inquire into whether the seniority requirement at
issue is really a "qualification" which must be met in order to perform the
job. The mere fact that it has been incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement, although relevant, is not determinative.15 7 In many instances,
past job experience is an appropriate proxy for measuring the skills, technical
ability, and knowledge needed to perform a higher-level job. In such
situations, one can safely argue that a disabled employee who lacks the
requisite seniority is not "qualified" for the position and, therefore, the
employer is under no duty to accommodate her via reassignment. Unilateral
reassignment of such an employee by an employer is difficult to justifyespecially if another employee possesses the required seniority and will lose
the opportunity to obtain the position. Arguably, the position, although
currently unoccupied, is technically not "vacant" for ADA reasonable
accommodation purposes because another employee could fill it. This would
meets the seniority requirements and is, in
be true only if another employee
5 8
fact, interested in the position. 1
There are some situations, however, where the seniority-job qualification
connection is more attenuated. For instance, some less labor-intensive
positions may be reserved for more senior employees as a reward for the
longevity of their employment. In this situation, the harm caused by the
employer's unilateral action could be seen as less severe-but further inquiry
is necessary to determine the actual threatened injury to other affected
bargaining unit employees. 159 For example, an economic loss, such as the
loss of additional pay or benefits, could be viewed as more severe than the
lost opportunity to work a more desirable shift or to work an "easier" job
because the affected employee suffers an actual, monetary loss as opposed to
a more amorphous psychological harm.' 60 A related concern is the degree
to which the non-disabled employee's expectations are infringed upon. If the
difference in seniority between the disabled employee and the non-disabled
employee is great, or the seniority requirement to obtain the position in

does not entail any immediate economic outlay, if it were to implement the accommodation over the
union's objections, or, worse yet, implement it without any discussion at all, the employer would almost
certainly incur substantial costs in litigating the matter before an arbitrator, the NLRB, or the courts.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
158. Given the individualized attention required for resolving accommodation requests, viewing the
matter in the abstract without consideration of whether, in a particular case, there is actually another
employee whose seniority-based expectations in the position will be disappointed would be analogous
to adopting a per se approach similar to those discussed in the Rehabilitation Act cases. See supra part
III.B.l. Such an approach would be a direct contradiction of the policies of the ADA and the
implementing regulations. See supra part III.C.
159. It must be recognized, however, that the union has a legitimate interest in rewarding its longterm members and that seniority provisions are a particularly effective way of doing so. Ideally, the
union would look past the symbolic value of preserving these sweetheart positions and recognize that,
in order for it to meet its ADA obligations, an exception to the seniority requirements may be in order.
160. This is, however, not always the case. Many employees are willing to forgo higher wages for
the opportunity to work the "day shift" or to have their weekends off. It is precisely for this reason that
many employers provide additional compensation in the way of shift or weekend premiums for
employees who work nontraditional shifts.
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question is fairly large, the frustrated expectations and the resultant harm may
rise to the level that the employer's unilateral action is more objectionable.' 6' Another important consideration is whether the accommodation
would affect only one employee other than the employee requesting
accommodation, or whether the interests of several employees would be
involved. 162 Obviously, the more employees affected by the accommodation,
the more significant it is to the employer's operation and the higher the
likelihood that the burden imposed would be "undue." In assessing these
issues, a relevant question would be whether the parties have waived or
modified the seniority requirements or other provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement."" If so, the expectations of bargaining unit employees may be less settled and the injury, therefore, not as great. In ADA terms,
the accommodation would not be "unduly disruptive," nor would it "substantially alter" the nature of the employer's operation."'
Finally, it would be useful to consider what a failure to make reasonable
accommodation would mean to the disabled employee. If it would entail a loss
of employment or a long-term layoff, the importance of allowing the
accommodation seems particularly strong-especially when considered in light
of the express congressional intent to provide opportunities for the disabled.
On the other hand, if a similar position will become available in the near
future, the employer's unilateral reassignment at this time may be less
justified because the requested accommodation could be made when the
position becomes available, while some other less-intrusive accommodation
65
could be made in the short term.
CONCLUSION
The obligations imposed on unions and employers by the ADA are indeed
numerous, and the conflicts such obligations may cause with respect to the
NLRA are difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, the union and the employer must
strive to make the effort. In the vast majority of situations, the employer and
the union can avoid potential conflicts between their NLRA and ADA
obligations by planning ahead and working cooperatively. When problems do

161. See Stahlhut, supra note 86, at 94-95 (arguing that seniority differences and the length of time
that the collective bargaining agreement has been in place are relevant considerations in assessing
whether other employees' expectation interests will be frustrated by a proposed accommodation).
162. See Ervin, supra note 86, at 969 (stating that the union should consider the number of
bargaining unit employees adversely affected before agreeing to a proposed accommodation).
163. See Tawzer v. Foote & Davies, Inc. of Delaware, 109 L.R.LM. (BNA) 2042 (D. Ga. 1981)
(holding that a ud-term modification of employee seniority rights by the employer and union is
permissible under certain circumstances, even though it adversely affects some employees); 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 49, at 699-710 (discussing waiver in the collective bargaining
process and noting that the waiver doctrine has been narrowly defined by the NLRB and the courts).
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) app. at 402.
165. Conversely, one could argue that the employer's unilateral action in such a situation is actually
less harmful since, by placing the disabled employee in the position, it has met its duty to make
reasonable accommodation. Further, the more senior nondisabled employee does not suffer a great
injustice since she will have to wait only a short time before a new position becomes available.
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arise, only by balancing the interests of all the parties involved can we
adequately further the goals of the ADA while simultaneously recognizing the
importance of the national labor policy in promoting industrial peace and in
helping to eradicate discrimination against the disabled.

